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Abstract 
 
This article examines changes to the National Assembly for Wales committees and how they act 
as markers that help explain the dynamics of a significant and contemporaneous constitutional 
journey. It uses as its backdrop recent constitutional and political change in the UK, particularly 
that initiated by devolution. Uniquely, we draw upon management theory as well as political sci-
ence to explain why changes in the focus, identity and profile of Assembly committees represent 
significant markers or reflectors of constitutional shifts. We suggest that examining key compo-
nents within the internal architecture of parliaments at different stages of development offers an 
additional and complementary level of institutional analysis. Our review of the Assembly commit-
tees reveals that they have reflected the pace and shape of change in Welsh devolution, and that 
shifts in their profile and operation offer another insight into devolution, whilst also reflecting 
wider institutional and political change.   
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CHRONICLING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES AS MARKERS 
OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
 
Introduction 
Renewed interest in the operation and modernisation of parliaments, set alongside the current un-
precedentedly fluid constitutional politics in the United Kingdom, provides an opportunity to con-
sider alternative ways of chronicling institutional change within parliamentary settings and of  as-
sessing the role of parliamentary committees in absorbing and reflecting constitutional dynamics. 
This article explores the role of key components within the internal architecture of the National 
Assembly for Wales [Assembly], one of UK’s devolved legislatures, in mapping and marking 
some significant chapters in its institutional development, a journey that has been precipitated by 
a heavy constitutional flux since 1999 when the Assembly was established. 
 
Much of the literature around constitutional change explores challenges in reconciling customary 
constitutional principles - parliamentary sovereignty, in particular - with the practice, politics and 
judicial implications of devolution and Europeanisation (Gifford 2010; Carter, 2013; Elcock and 
Keating, 2013; Bradbury and Mawson 2014; Elliott 2015). The redefinition of the citizen-parlia-
ment proxy has also attracted some interest in the context of reconnecting citizens with the political 
process (Leston-Bandeira 2012, 2016), and the use of referenda for dealing with constitutional 
issues (Curtice 2013; Laycock 2013). Yet, how parliamentary institutions specifically absorb these 
high level constitutional shifts internally has been less explored. 
 
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution modelled its own definition of the con-
stitution as: ‘the set of laws, rules and practices that create the basic institutions of the state, and 
its component and related parts, and stipulate the powers of those institutions and the relationship 
between the different institutions and between those institutions and the individual’ (House of 
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Lords, 2001/2). From a territorial perspective, constitutional change in Wales includes any trans-
formation or adaptation of the constituent framework supporting the post 1999 polity: devolved 
powers and competencies, power structures, the relationships between them, the citizen-Assembly 
link. We use this as a mechanism for distinguishing between institutional and constitutional change 
and for determining where institutional change instigates constitutional shifts and vice versa, when 
constitutional shifts lead to dramatic institutional reconfiguration. 
 
Given the UK predilection for outsourcing constitutional deliberation to independent or Royal 
Commissions (McAllister 2005, McAllister and Stirbu 2008), the literature (in the UK) focusing 
on the specific contributions made by parliamentary committees to institutionalising and stimulat-
ing constitutional change is rather scarce, as the focus lies predominantly on their pre-legislative 
and legislative scrutiny roles. Analysis of institutional modernisation at Westminster, focused on 
strengthening select committees’ effectiveness vis a vis scrutiny, legislative efficiency, and policy 
contribution is extremely useful (Norton 2000; Flinders 2002; Brazier et al 2005; Russell 2011). 
Griffiths and Evans (2013) offer some insight into the Commons Welsh Affairs Select Commit-
tee’s role in constitutional development and in devolving of further powers to Wales. Outside 
Westminster, analysis of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish committees is limited to studies of 
operation, participative nature, scrutiny capacity and policy influence (see Arter 2004, 2006; 
Cairney 2006; McAllister and Stirbu 2007, McLaverty and McLeod 2012; Cole 2014; Cole and 
McAllister 2015). Stirbu (2009) explores how constitutional dynamics in Wales have shaped the 
institutional development of the National Assembly and opens the debate around the extent to 
which institutional change itself precipitated constitutional shifts in Wales.  
 
More broadly, the rich body of literature linking parliamentary modernisation to strengthening 
committee systems tends to focus mostly on legislation or oversight committees, ignoring other 
types (i.e. ad-hoc, procedures, finance) (see Longley eds. 1994; Dorring ed. 1995; Longley and 
Agh eds. 1997; Longley 2012). Most functionalist studies develop useful comparators of parlia-
mentary practice, measures of strength, influence, and committee cohesion (Hazan 2003),  yet, 
they tend to assume a high degree of institutional maturity and optimality (Strom 1998). This seems 
Page 5 
questionable in the case of small or newly established institutions - such as the National Assembly 
-, where size is an important constraining factor.  
 
Similarly, new institutionalists’ concern with legislative organisation (Mattsom and Strom 1995) 
places committee systems at the heart of parliamentary deliberative or legislative processes (Dor-
ring 2001; Pollack 2003; Arter, 2006), yet the agency perspective underpinning such approaches 
gives prominence to political parties as the principal form of parliamentary organisation, whilst 
regarding committees as mere extensions of political parties (Damgaard 1995; Kim and Loewen-
berg 2005) - a significant limitation in our opinion. Studies of committees’ cohesion, autonomy 
and counterweighting government party domination (Drewry 1985; Kelly 2013) can offer better 
balance.  
 
Our study addresses the existing gaps and limitations of the scholarship to date by 1) expanding 
analysis to a broader range of committees, some with administrative or internal corporate govern-
ance roles and which, we argue, are equally critical in shaping our understanding of how institu-
tions behave in changing constitutional contexts; and 2) by chronicling committees’ contributions 
to institution building using a holistic and more forensic analysis of the institutionalisation process. 
Our case study on the Assembly committees is justified by the fact that Wales has experienced a 
steady accrual of powers and a rapidly shifting constitutional terrain since devolution, reflected in 
its internal architecture and operation over the last 20 years. Naturally, this has had a direct effect 
on its committee system, seen as the “engine room” and the “heartbeat” of the Assembly. There-
fore, the Assembly’s institutional journey provides fruitful terrain to test our central contention 
that committees are valuable reflectors that mark the change process.  
 
The objectives of this article are four fold. First, we chronicle the evolution of the Assembly’s 
committee system, mapping it across the four stages in Wales’s constitutional settlement to date. 
Second, we investigate how the committee system has encapsulated devolution’s most prominent 
rhetoric - that of closer engagement with the citizens. Third, we consider committees’ usefulness 
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in understanding Wales’s constitutional development by exploring the extent to which constitu-
tional affairs and procedural change have been embedded in permanent structures and processes 
within the Assembly. Finally, we investigate the extent to which the committee system has matured 
and achieved stable patterns of organisation, behaviour, and autonomy.  
 
Our rationale for focusing on parliamentary committees’ specific contribution to institution-build-
ing has been stimulated on the one hand by the significant constitutional flux in the UK and, on 
the other hand, by the way in which shifts in the internal architecture of parliamentary institutions 
act as levers for better understanding wider change.  Furthermore, the devolution of power within 
the UK has reignited interest in different parliamentary structures that operate adjacently. Given 
the Assembly committees’ propensity to absorb and engineer change, we were encouraged to adopt 
a more holistic approach to understanding institutional change, especially when this is prompted 
by rapid constitutional shifts. The subsidiary value of this is that it also generates renewed analysis 
of committee systems themselves that extends beyond their traditional functions in legislative scru-
tiny and oversight of government. 
 
Approach 
 
The article draws out specific evidence from over 12 years’ research by the authors on devolution 
in Wales that explored key aspects of the Assembly’s development as a parliamentary institution. 
Within this, a wide range of ethnographic and documentary methods has been employed to inves-
tigate institutional shifts. Between 2004 and 2016, we conducted over 100 interviews with politi-
cians, senior officials and staff, and constitutional experts. We have also conducted a focus group 
with subject committee clerks exploring lessons from early experimentation with public engage-
ment. Further participant observation between 2006 and 2011 provided unique insight into how 
the Assembly managed the transition from a corporate body to a parliamentary structure. We also 
draw on direct and active participation in some of the Assembly’s major institutional transfor-
mations in advisory capacities through expert groups, panels and commissions. Supporting this is 
documentary research including extensive analysis of committees’ operational documents 
Page 7 
(minutes, agendas, reports).  
 
The specific theoretical approach we adopt is important as it blends elements of political theory 
with management analysis to create a unique framework within which to evaluate the Assembly 
committees’ overall contribution to institutional development. Drawing on institutional theory, our 
starting assumption is that new political institutions exhibit an inherent volatility at both structural 
and operational level (Huntington 2006). Our interest is in exploring and understanding the pro-
cesses by which new institutions become stable, valued and predictable. The measure of parlia-
mentary institutionalisation is given by the level of functional and organisational differentiation of 
the committee system from the wider political environment and the extent to which committee 
practice becomes established and predictable (Olson and Crowther 2002).  
 
We were guided by a vast body of literature focused on the institutionalisation of parliaments 
(Paterson and Copeland 1994; Norton 1998), especially from the perspective of regime change in 
Eastern Europe (Agh, 1998; Olson and Crowther 2002). This is particularly helpful because it 
accounts for highly dynamic constitutional contexts. The UK’s devolved legislatures featured a 
significant degree of institutional volatility in their early years. They arguably had less institutional 
legacy than the transitional legislatures in Eastern Europe and benefited from a relative blank-slate 
which permits certain experimentation to take place (McAllister and Stirbu 2007a and b). How-
ever, just as within the new democratic legislatures in Eastern Europe, committees are nested 
within parliaments and contribute to their development and maturing process (Olson and Crowther 
2002). 
 
Devolution, although evidently not as dramatic a transition as from an oppressive regime to a 
democratic one, does challenge at least some of the tenets of the UK constitution (House of Lords, 
2011) by creating a multilevel system of governance: from centrist to more decentralised policy-
making, from a majoritarian politics to a more pluralist one (McAllister and Kay 2010) and from 
an elitist to a more participatory and inclusive political culture. In the UK, these were articulated 
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as the very goals of devolution -a process designed to close the gap between government and the 
people. 
 
Then, borrowing from management theory, we draw upon approaches that focus on the strategic 
positioning of organisations within their wider industry for the purpose of gaining competitive 
advantage (Porter 1996), in other words exploring organisations’ strategic fit within their broad 
environments (societal, sectoral, organisational). The establishment and development of political 
institutions also raises questions around the logic and appropriateness of institutional design and 
change (Olsen and March 2004) and, in so far as competitive advantage needs conceptual realign-
ment, there is a strong case for parliaments considering positioning strategies within ever complex, 
multilevel systems, where public profile and trust, for instance, are crucial to legitimacy, and their 
bargaining power is essential for effective scrutiny.  
 
We explore new ground by employing a different interpretation of the Aston Matrix (Table 1), a 
management tool developed as a positioning and sense making device that helps organisations 
scan their near and far environments and make sense of factors impacting them (Brown and Os-
bourne 2012). Management analysis is generally concerned with future trends. However, in this 
article, we adopt a more retrospective approach. The validity of the Aston Matrix, as applied here, 
is that it allows us to analyse committees’ contributions at multiple levels: societal, constitutional 
and organisation level, by identifying some of the most important determinant of change, at each 
level, along their institutional journey.  
 
Given the level of political and administrative flux around Welsh devolution, it was important that 
we took an expansive approach to committees, by including subject, standing as well as ad-hoc 
committees, and explore their role in the management, administration and repeated reconfiguration 
of the institution, a contribution that, to date, has remained largely undocumented in academic 
studies and only loosely conceptualised in theory. 
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Management literature uses a traditional, yet limiting classification of the determinants of change: 
political, social, economic, and technological trends, usually. However, we regard institutional 
change as extremely complex and we are interested in identifying the strongest proxy through 
which change is channelled at each level.  
 
Devolution stimulated deep transformations at every level in the Assembly’s environment. At so-
cietal (meta) level, we position committees, as our principal focus of analysis, within the new 
deliberative space created by devolution. Public engagement, encompassing anything from out-
reach, informing, and involving the public, to maintaining an outward-looking and visible public 
profile, is identified early as the main proxy through which the Assembly has both absorbed and 
sought to deliver upon the devolution rhetoric, and established itself as a legitimate actor repre-
senting the people of Wales. This legitimacy is somewhat fragile however, as discussed by Scully 
and Wyn Jones (2015). We examine committees’ roles in institutionalising the relationship be-
tween the public and the Assembly and document the evolution of mechanisms for engagement, 
assessing the extent to which these have become standardised.  
 
At sectoral (macro) level, we identify institutional development, especially of constitutional sig-
nificance, as the proxy for examining to what extent the Assembly has acquired value, predicta-
bility and resilience in the face of political change. We focus on investigating committees’ contri-
butions to informing some of the wider constitutional debates around the Assembly’s structure and 
status. At micro (organisational) level, we focus on the stability and predictability of the committee 
system as a whole, and in particular on committees’ autonomy and scrutiny capacity.  
 
Table 1 - The Aston Matrix:  
Level  Meta Macro Micro 
Dominant Factors 
stimulating institution 
building 
Public engagement   
 Constitutional affairs  
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  Committee system insti-
tutionalisation 
 
 
 
Positioning these elements on the three distinctive levels of the Aston Matrix that incorporate the 
Assembly’s near and far environments helps gauge the committees’ fullest contributions to con-
stitutional and organisational change and to the wider democratic process in Wales. Furthermore, 
this helps test the solidification and maturing of organisational practice within the institution.  
 
 
Assembly committees and constitutional arrangements 
 
The Assembly’s relatively short existence (currently half way into its fifth term) can be punctuated 
by three institutional interregnums, distinguished as follows: the corporate body period (1999-
2007) under the constitutive Government of Wales Act 1998; the interim constitution period 
(2007-2011) under the Government of Wales Act 2006; the primary (conferred) powers period, 
following the 2011 referendum1. 
 
[Table 2 - The evolution of the Assembly committee system] 
 
Under the corporate body model (GoWA 1998, S.1 ss.2), the Assembly committees reflected to 
an extent, both the constitutional limitations of Welsh devolution and the grand aspirations in re-
lation to inclusiveness. There were  some unusual prescriptions on committees number, types, and 
membership rules. The most significant of these was that the executive secretary (later known as 
‘minister’) be a member of the subject committee reviewing their relevant portfolio (GoWA 1998, 
S. 57 ss. 4). This brought obvious benefits around information sharing across the committee, but 
                                                 
1
 A fourth stage - based on a reserved powers model - has emerged following the Wales Acts 2014 and 
2017.  
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attracted heavy criticism for hindering the development of a stronger scrutiny culture (Richard 
Commission 2004; McAllister and Stirbu 2007a) 
 
The interim constitution stage, framed by the Government of Wales Act 2006, marks the formal  
separation of executive and enhanced legislative functions of the Assembly, and signalled a move 
to a less prescriptive framework with regards to the Assembly’s internal organisation (GoWA 
2006, s.28 & 29). However, legislative powers were only granted in two stages. In the interim 
stage, powers were enhanced by Assembly Measures2 in competence areas (Schedule 5 of GoWA 
2006, S.95) and by possibly amending Schedule 5 via Legislative Competence Orders (LCO), 
which required the approval of the Assembly and of both Houses of Parliament. A significant re-
configuration of the committee system occurred, separating legislation and scrutiny roles of com-
mittees. Legislation committees were initially set-up as ad-hoc, along the lines of Westminster 
public bill committees, and later replaced by five permanent legislation committees, with no par-
ticular thematic specialisation, other than one being exclusively dedicated to members’ proposed 
legislation.  
 
The next stage, enshrined in Part IV of the 2006 Act, set out the steps towards full primary legis-
lative powers in fields of devolved competence, conditional on support in a referendum. The ref-
erendum in March 2011 saw 65.35% vote in favour of the move. Since 2011, the Assembly’s 
powers, structure and operations define it as a parliamentary body, on similar footing with the 
other UK devolved legislatures. The more streamlined legislative process and a more strategic 
organisational environment following the establishment of the Assembly Commission, created 
radically different conditions for the committee system aspiring to promote a connected approach 
to legislation and scrutiny (Assembly Commission 2013). The cross cutting committee portfolios 
were carried over and expanded, and legislative duties were once again blended in with scrutiny, 
                                                 
2 Similar to Acts of Parliament  
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resulting in five committees covering both policy and legislation alongside a series of other rela-
tively well-established standing committees, some of which with important institutional legacy 
(i.e. Business, Public Accounts or Standard of Conduct).  
 
Aston Matrix applied 
Meta-level: Committees’ public engagement 
 
Our analysis started by assessing committees’ contributions to institutionalising public engage-
ment through the ‘parent’ organisation. We reviewed formal consultation mechanisms (oral and 
written evidence gathering) as well as informal engagement practices (direct engagement with 
stakeholders via informal meetings, focus and reference groups, outreach via off site visits, sur-
veys, rapporteurs) and ICT facilitated engagement (online discussion forums, social media use, 
video engagement). These initiatives help expose the qualitative and quantitative relationship be-
tween the Assembly and the public, which is integral to the devolution project given the original 
goals around inclusiveness, openness, and democratic renewal (against a backdrop of perceived 
limited legitimacy given the 1997 Referendum saw just 50.3% of voters support the establishment 
of an Assembly). 
 
As criteria for institutionalisation, Olson and Crowther (2002) single out organisational and func-
tional differentiation from the environment, and the use of universalistic rather particularistic 
standards. Organisational and functional differentiation refers to the existence of distinctive insti-
tutional structures, process and resources channelled towards supporting, in our case, the Assem-
bly’s engagement practices. The evolution of the Welsh committee system shows evidence of all 
three criteria being met (or partially met) in terms of entrenching public engagement into commit-
tee operation in a stable and predictable way.  
 
We distinguish two stages here. The first appears counterintuitive and is underpinned by features 
of the original corporate body, namely a lack of clear legislative focus which allowed committees 
Page 13 
to experiment with policy development instead, and a lack of overarching corporate strategy, 
which meant committees developed their own ways of direct engagement with stakeholders and 
the public. Most of this experimentation was dominated by informal practices and by particularistic 
rather than universal standards.  
 
In one focus group3, subject committee clerks highlighted the limited formalisation and standard-
isation of public consultations during the first two terms. The relative informality of engagement 
mechanisms, allegedly facilitating smoother access to committees - as one chief executive of a 
prominent civil society organisation mentioned - comes more from the lack of institutional and 
procedural precedent, rather than from a calculated attempt to innovate. Committee clerks consid-
ered that to some extent these limitations actually worked to the Assembly’s benefit in the process 
of institutional learning, as a number of engagement mechanisms were established and tested: for-
mal consultation exercises, reference groups, off-site visits, rapporteurs. Nonetheless, the frenzy 
of consultation initiated by Assembly committees as well as by the government side arguably left 
the Welsh civic society drained and fatigued (Chaney and Fevre, 2001; Day 2006). Questions 
about the depth of consultation exercises in the early years of the Assembly led to attempts to 
diversify mechanisms to reach out to the general public more widely. Yet, as the participants in 
our focus group reveal, some of the  more expansive engagement exercises in the second term 
struggled, at times, with the overall quality of the evidence gathered. 
 
The second stage took place within the more strategically-oriented institutional climate post 2007 
under the Assembly Commission’s leadership, which put public engagement and engagement with 
young people at the heart of its first comprehensive strategies (Assembly Commission 2007, 2011) 
and changed the organisation and management of the committee support services (Assembly Com-
mission, 2013).  
 
                                                 
3
 Conducted in 2006  
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At committee level, the citizen-Assembly link has been enhanced by the introduction of the peti-
tions process4, and  the establishment of a Petitions Committee. As one of the most common forms 
of political engagement of the last few decades (Hansard Society 2010), yet clearly not a panacea 
for successfully effecting political or policy change (Hough 2012), the Assembly’s petitions sy-
stem is, nonetheless, evidence of organisational and functional differentiation of Assembly’s en-
gagement role.  
 
The petition system followed the more established and advanced Scottish Parliament petitions 
substantive model, making it easily accessible to the public and, through visible presence and out-
reach, encouraging citizens to engage. The Assembly Petitions Committee can solicit action from 
relevant government Ministers, conduct its own inquiries, or refer the matter to other committees, 
whilst continuing to monitor progress. There is some evidence that petitioning has been actively 
pursued by the Welsh public, with more than 700 petitions received by February 2017, out of 
which 311 were completed. Assessing the real and direct impact of petitioning beyond entrenching 
the citizen-Assembly relationship is problematic and beyond the scope of our work. However, we 
are interested in the institutional nestedness of the petition system within the Assembly. The 2016 
review of the petition system suggests that, whilst certain reforms are necessary to improve acces-
sibility and overall impact of petitioning (Petitions Committee 2016), the system has achieved a 
certain degree of stability and predictability.  
 
Outside the petitions system, committees have formalised and standardised the consultation pro-
cesses within their policy inquiry work. This follows a familiar template: committees issue con-
sultation letters; individuals, groups and organisations respond; committees invite oral evidence 
from witnesses and experts; deliberation and reports are published. Since 2007, all committees -
without exception- have followed this pattern proving that ‘consultation’ has become a universal 
standard of formal engagement. There are of course variations in the scope of consultations, as our 
data from the fourth term illustrates. 
                                                 
4
 paper petitions in 2007 and e-petitions in 2008  
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Figure 1 - Committee Public Engagement in Policy Enquiries in the 4th Assembly- to replace 
existing figure  
 
 
Qualitative improvements in the process include better referencing of the evidence received, along-
side with full publication of the responses and of evidence sessions recordings. Some of our inter-
views in 2015/16 suggested this was partly attributed to feedback from organisations that saw little 
acknowledgement and ‘influence’ of their contributions. Rumbul (2016) challenges the represent-
ativeness of this formal engagement process pointing to the disproportionately low number of 
women appearing in front of committees in oral evidence sessions.  
 
Beyond this formal engagement with the usual suspects -civil society organisations, local author-
ities, business and individual experts- committee clerking and support teams have sought to reach 
out to the broader public. Enhancing informal as well as online engagement has been one of the 
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strategies pursued in the third and fourth terms. Our interviews reveal that the type of policy in-
quiry (follow ups, snap scrutiny of government policy, broader reviews) will however determine 
the scale and nature of the engagement. This may explain variations in the way committees seek 
to engage the public outside the formal call for evidence and witnesses. Another explanation, as 
some of our interviewees point, is the variable level of enthusiasm at the level of the committee 
chair and clerking team. 
 
The integration and co-location of support services for committees (clerking, research, legal ad-
vice, communication  and outreach) in the fourth term (Assembly Commission 2013) created the 
conditions for further customisation and diversification of direct and indirect engagement, espe-
cially with regards to surveys, facilitating focus groups on given themes, creating and mediating 
online discussion forums and producing video engagement tools, feeding back into the commit-
tees’ inquiry work. The advanced use of information and communication technology (webcasting 
and video engagement) enhanced accessibility to committees of remote witnesses and of the gen-
eral public in general. This suggests that committees internalised some of the devolution rhetoric 
by entrenching accessibility and transparency in their day-to-day operation. 
 
Our analysis reveals a conscious effort made by committees towards a qualitative (i.e. avoiding 
anecdotal evidence, reaching out beyond the usual suspects) and quantitative (i.e. diversifying 
channels and mechanisms of engagement) improvement of the citizen-Assembly relationship. This 
process, at first informal, unidirectional, lacking standardisation and clarity of purpose, gradually 
matured in the third and fourth terms, whilst also being incorporated at strategic level. An im-
portant shift has been clarifying the purpose public engagement serves at institutional and com-
mittee level (Assembly Commission 2011, 2013).   
 
The evidence presented here points to a higher degree of functional and organisational differenti-
ation of public engagement within the committees system. This has been achieved first by means 
of the Petitions Committee, a structure that shows elements of stability and continuity, and second 
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by the Assembly Commission’s contribution to embedding public engagement within institutional 
strategy. 
 
Macro-level: Committees as agents of organisational change and reflectors of constitutional 
change  
 
The next level of analysis explores Assembly’s positioning within the devolved constitutional con-
text. We identified the institutionalisation of constitutional affairs and procedural change as the 
main proxy by which the Assembly evolved from a limited corporate body structure towards an 
established UK legislature. By constitutional affairs, we mean anything from influence over, or 
decision upon, the Assembly’s internal operation and structure, scrutiny of external constitutional 
decisions impacting on Wales, triggering and shaping constitutional deliberations. We take the 
view that some institutional changes within the Assembly have constitutional significance and so 
treat them as such. 
 
Constitutional debate intensified with the publication of the Better Governance for Wales White 
Paper 2005, and the subsequent Government of Wales Bill 2006, which proposed the formal sep-
aration between the executive and legislative arms of the Assembly - one of the landmarks of  in 
Wales’ constitutional development. By the time the separation process was launched (end of 2015), 
there had been limited institutionalisation of constitutional affairs within the Assembly, bar from 
the Welsh Assembly Government’s own constitutional affairs unit, itself a non-permanent feature.  
 
The process preparing the grounds for the administrative, political and legal separation was oper-
ationalised by a series of ad hoc committees. In May 2006, in response to provisions in the Gov-
ernment of Wales Bill, the Assembly established a shadow Commission to plan for the Assembly’s 
future and to oversee the final stages of administrative separation between the parliamentary and 
executive branches (Stirbu 2009). The Shadow Commission conducted significant work in relation 
to repositioning the Assembly (as a legislature) within the Welsh polity, with a separate identity 
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from the (then) Welsh Assembly Government. During the same period (2006-2007), the Commit-
tee on the Standing Orders, another ad-hoc structure, designed the new internal procedures for the 
post-corporate body Assembly, thus redefining the power dynamics within the Welsh constitu-
tional system.  
 
The legislative-executive relationship represents an important source of institutionalisation and 
institutional autonomy of parliaments around the world (Olson and Crowther 2002) since it is nor-
mally indicative of institutional maturity (Norton 1998; Olson and Crowther 2002). Yet, existing 
scholarship is mostly silent on hybrid - that is, blurred lines between legislative and executive 
functions - and emerging institutions (like the Assembly) that operate within extremely fluid con-
stitutional contexts and experience gradual accrual of powers. The Assembly’s constitutional jour-
ney is to some degree one of normalising this relationship, first within the context of the corporate 
body and, later, set against separation and enhanced legislative powers. The Assembly committee 
system’s evolution has reflected this journey to a great extent, from subtle, yet powerful changes 
in the way committees separated meeting in scrutiny and policy mode during the corporate body, 
to the reconfiguration of committees along broad cross cutting themes rather than mirroring min-
isterial portfolios.  
 
Institutionalisation is a process that requires time, consolidation of practice, dissemination of val-
ues and continuity of structures (Patterson and Copeland 1994). Whereas the Shadow Commission 
represented a first instance of strategic corporate leadership shaping the Assembly’s constitutional 
vision, the Committee on Standing Orders created the first real platform for the Assembly to design 
its internal structure and operations, thus signalling a qualitative move from implementation of 
constitutional provisions to principal agent of change. This is further evidenced by the establish-
ment of other ad-hoc committees that scrutinised constitutional and legislative proposals affecting 
Wales: the Committee on the Better Governance for Wales White Paper (in 2005), and the Com-
mittee on the Government of Wales Bill (in 2006).  Nonetheless, despite some evidence of func-
tional differentiation, these were ad-hoc, temporary structures. 
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Post 2007, we note a more rapid pace in embedding constitutional affairs and procedural change 
within permanent structures in the committee system. For instance, revising the internal procedures 
became the responsibility of the Business Committee, a permanent and influential structure in the 
Assembly, benefitting from a relatively stable membership. The Constitutional Affairs Commit-
tee5, established in the third term, is another permanent structure, built on the legacy of the former 
(secondary) Legislation Committee that has seen its portfolio enhanced to scrutinising constitu-
tional issues arising from the fluid nature of devolution in Wales. The Committee's work on the 
pre-legislative scrutiny of the Draft Wales Bill in 2015, alongside that of the Welsh Affairs Select 
Committee’s at Westminster, was critical in ensuring the Secretary of State for Wales  reconsidered 
its approach to shaping Wales’ next constitutional settlement  and addressed a series of major 
concerns raised in the process (BBC News, 29 February 2016).  
 
Similarly, the Assembly Commission became the main forum for strategic corporate thinking and 
forward planning, and continues to play an important role in the process of resource allocation 
(Assembly Commission 2013) and in ensuring the Assembly’s strategic fit within the changing 
constitutional context (Assembly Commission, 2015). The Presiding Officer recently undertook 
forward planning around anticipated changes from the Wales Act 2017, and significantly, has led 
proposals for reform of the electoral system, the size and capacity of the Assembly and Votes at 
16, in the light of the devolution of electoral matters to the Assembly (National Assembly for 
Wales, 1 February 2017). 
 
The evidence presented here points to significant shifts in the way the Assembly has positioned 
itself within the constitutional arena. We notice the more established and standardised manner for 
responding to constitutional change in the third, fourth and fifth terms, as opposed to the less in-
stitutionalised way in which the Assembly operated prior to 2007.  
 
Micro-level:  Organisational stability, continuity and autonomy 
                                                 
5
 Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee in the 5th term 
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At micro-level, we focus on the maturing of committees from an organisational perspective. We 
are especially interested in the evolution of structural attributes of the committee system, such as 
number, size, permanence of committees, and membership characteristics (incumbency, turnover) 
across the four terms, thus exposing the degree of stability and continuity. The extent to which the 
committee system achieved a relative autonomy from the rest of the Assembly is also relevant. 
 
The committee model remained largely unchanged in the first two terms in terms of number, type, 
size of committees and their relationship with the rest of the Assembly. The only structural vola-
tility is the number of ad-hoc committees established, a stark contrast between two in the first term, 
and ten in the second. This was largely accounted for the institutional response to a heavy consti-
tutional flux generated by the re-election of a Labour Government and its Welsh devolution plans6, 
and to more intense legislative activity concerning Wales at Westminster, which required scrutiny 
from the Assembly. The relative stability of the corporate body committee model should be at-
tributed more to the constraining legislative framework than to anything else.  
 
The number of committees was drastically streamlined, from 32 in second term to 12 in the fourth 
term. Membership and size rules themselves changed from being strict and prescribed7 (see Table 
2) during the corporate body, to allowing more flexibility in the fourth term. In the context of the 
small Assembly size (60 members), the number of committees and their membership is critical, 
giving the strain on individual Members’ workload. Multiple memberships in committees has been 
one of the hindrances to effective scrutiny in the first term (McAllister and Stirbu 2007a) and 
although this has improved in the fourth term, it remains the highest in the UK legislatures: during 
the fifth term there are 44 Members and 83 committee roles to fill (EPAER, 2017). Thus far, the 
capacity issue has been mitigated via institutional engineering: committees of variable size, 
                                                 
6 Committee on the Better Governance for Wales (2005-2007), the Shadow Commission (2006-2007), 
Committee on the Standing Orders (2005-2007), Committee on the Government for Wales Bill (2006) 
7 To reflect the overall party balance in the Assembly 
Page 21 
streamlining the number of committees and their portfolios, more effective use of subcommittees 
and rapporteurs.  
 
Other measures of committee institutionalisation focus on their relationship with the rest of the 
Assembly and on their legislative autonomy. On both of these measures, the committees provide 
evidence of steady maturing and consolidation. Committee autonomy can be hindered by exces-
sive party control over committee members and by attempts to minimise dissent -this possibly 
explaining the high turnover in committee membership in the first term. More specific to the As-
sembly was the executive dominance in the corporate body period due to ministerial membership 
in subject committees. For example, committees portfolio changes usually reflected reshuffles on 
the executive side (e.g. agriculture and rural development portfolio changed to environment, plan-
ning and countryside in the second term). Since 2007, when the Assembly started operating de 
facto as a parliament, committees can amend bills (at committee stage) and have legislative initi-
ative, which they have used successfully on three occasions (Committee on Standards of Conduct 
with one legislative initiative in the third term and the Commission with two initiatives- admit-
tedly, all on internal matters rather than wider public policy). The recasting of committee portfolios 
in the third and fourth terms suggests a more deliberate and planned attempt to naturally realign 
some policy priorities (e.g. children and young people with education; environment with sustain-
ability etc). 
 
The transformation of the committee system at organisational and operational level reflects,  to a 
great extent, the development of Welsh devolution. It maps all of its significant landmarks: the 
overly prescribed, limited and executive-driven corporate body, the complexity of the interim con-
stitution which led to the more consolidated stage of primary powers, all underpinned by the strug-
gle to balance the small size and capacity with an expanding portfolio of power and competencies. 
A significant finding here is the role of strategic management in mitigating, or addressing (when 
within its powers) the capacity issue of the Assembly, a leitmotif of Welsh devolution. Overall, 
the committees’ evolution has largely been from novelty, peculiarity, and experimentation to ab-
sorbing traditional and more widely established parliamentary norms and practices. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chronicling of the Assembly committees and their development underlines the consolidation 
of stable and predictable patterns of organisation, operation and responsiveness to change. Taken 
as a whole, we find that the committees encapsulate devolution’s most prominent rhetorical strand, 
that of closer engagement with citizens framed by a more open and accessible politics. This ap-
proach characterised the operation of the policy-oriented committees, via some interesting exper-
imentation, in the first two Assemblies, but with little standardisation of consultative and engage-
ment practices. As the Assembly matured, so public engagement became more entrenched at stra-
tegic level and functionally and organisationally differentiated via permanent structures such as 
the Petitions’ Committee or via the newly integrated committee support services. Our analysis has 
highlighted the strong correlation between devolution’s inclusive rhetoric and its transposition in 
organisational structures and processes.  
 
Secondly, we consider committees to be a useful device for understanding the wider change pro-
cess, initially by innovative adaptation and reconfiguration of structures (institutional engineer-
ing), and later by becoming active and more autonomous deliberators and scrutinisers of wider 
constitutional shifts around them. As the Assembly acquired more traditional parliamentary struc-
tures such as the Commission and the Business Committee, constitutional considerations became 
more embedded at committee level and were given elevated attention through better scrutiny and 
oversight.   
 
The micro level of the Aston Matrix also helped map the extent to which the committees have 
achieved stable patterns of organisation, membership, permanence and autonomy with respect to 
the rest of the Assembly. At this level, we found a higher degree of predictability throughout the 
fourth Assembly, some radical changes in the committee system in the third term, and a relatively 
higher instability of the committee system in the first two Assemblies between 1999 and 2007. 
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There was also a significant change in terms of the statutory framework regarding their organisa-
tion, ranging from highly prescribed to more flexible as the institution matured. The structural 
changes in the committees in the third and fourth Assemblies are indicative of their more strategic 
management by the Commission, a stronger focus on scrutiny, and a larger and institutionalised 
emphasis on public engagement. The establishment of the Assembly Commission ensured that 
strategic leadership was formalised, with a clear outline of the role that committees were expected 
to play within the broader institutional strategy.  
 
Overall, our analysis reveals a close relationship between the Assembly’s internal committee sys-
tem and processes, and the wider strategic operating context. The committees have actively shaped 
the Assembly’s internal configuration and procedures, whilst also informing and contributing to 
broader constitutional debates, especially through driving greater public engagement.  
 
This article offers a different take on the typical journey of change and adaptation within a demo-
cratic institution. In focusing exclusively on committees in a new institution, a rarely used area of 
internal architecture for such research, it has explored the process of institutional change. The 
paper’s contribution is twofold: first, by fusing management analysis and political theory in its 
conceptual approach, it has allowed for a different and more forensic analysis of the markers for 
change. Secondly, and uniquely we believe, it has focused upon changes in committee profile and 
identity, suggesting a role for them as significant reflectors of constitutional change. This hybrid 
theoretical framework offers insight into how a parliamentary organisation strategically manages 
and resources its deliberative practices, essential to positioning the institution within its wider pol-
ity. 
 
Whilst committees have been primarily evidenced as markers of change, our study also hints at a 
further perspective and a somewhat deeper level of analysis. It is too early to offer a conclusive 
verdict on the impact of committees as determinants of the change process as this will require 
further longitudinal and comparative studies. However, we can say that the development of ancil-
Page 24 
lary studies of committees is a positive and complementary addition to the wider study of consti-
tutional change, especially during periods of significant institutional flux. The Assembly commit-
tees have clearly reflected the pace and shape of changes in devolution, as well as reflecting on-
going constitutional debate on devolution itself.   
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